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Editorial 
Welcome to the second issue of the Journal of Network Forensics. The journal aims to 
provide a platform for the scholarly discussion of advances and techniques related to the 
forensic acquisition of data from networks, network centric information systems and 
associated client devices. The journal is the second security related journal published by 
secau - Security Research Centre at Edith Cowan University with now long-running Journal 
of Information Warfare being the first.  
 
The first article in this issue is about the forensic acquisition of evidence from ADSL routers 
using a variety of techniques to access information stored in memory of these devices. The 
second and third articles were selected from the fifth annual conference of the ADFSL 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law was held in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA on 
May 19-21, 2010. These articles focus on the forensics relating to the use of social 
networking forums and services. 
 
The second call for papers is currently out and can be accessed from the secau - Security 
Research Centre homepage at http://www.secau.org where you will also find details of 
subscription as well as submission requirements for authors. 
 
 
Craig Valli 
Editor  
Journal of Network Forensics 
secau - Security Research Centre 
http://www.secau.org 
Edith Cowan University 
Perth, Western Australia 
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The ADSL Router Forensics Process 
 
Patryk Szewczyk 
secau – Security Research Centre 
School of Computer and Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Perth, Western Australia 
p.szewczyk@ecu.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
In 2010 the number of threats targeting ADSL routers is continually increasing. New and 
emergent threats have been developed to bypass authentication processes and obtain 
admin privileges directly to the device. As a result many malicious attempts are being made 
to alter the configuration data and make the device subsequently vulnerable. This paper 
discusses the non-invasive digital forensics approach into extracting evidence from ADSL 
routers. Specifically it validates an identified digital forensic process of acquisition. The 
paper then discusses how the approach may be utilised to extract configuration data ever 
after a device has been compromised to the point where a lock-out state has been initiated.  
 
Keywords 
ADSL routers, digital forensics, router forensics, psyb0t, SoHo 
 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the latest Australian Bureau of Statistics report, there are currently over nine 
million active Internet connections in Australia alone. Of these approximately ninety 
percent comprise of non-dialup connections (ABS, 2009). With the continuing fall of 
broadband pricing, individuals have further incentive to adopt a broadband Internet 
connection. The main incentive behind adopting a broadband Internet connection is due to 
dialup connections becoming obsolete. This outdated technology is no longer suitable from 
a performance perspective for Small office Home office (SoHo) environments. 
  
To obtain a broadband Internet connection, individuals are required to utilise an 
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) router. SoHo users benefit from vendors 
shipping ADSL routers preconfigured with common networking requirements. This allows 
consumers to bypass the tedious configuration process and connect to the Internet in a 
streamlined manner. Within Australia, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are further 
supporting end-users in providing ADSL routers pre-configured with the client’s username 
and password. In-turn this permits the end-user with little knowledge of Information 
Technology, to simply connect the physical cables and be on the Internet within seconds.  
 
All these preconfigured networking devices come at a significant cost. Conversely, pre-
configured ADSL routers usually incorporate little or no security. This may reduce the 
amount of skill required to initially utilise the device. However, this also results in the 
security aspects employed not protecting the device itself, or the internal hosts. As a result 
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many SoHo ADSL routers are vulnerable to a range of emerging threats. The number one 
method by which to secure an ADSL router is to change the default password to something 
less evident. Unfortunately, the majority of vendors do not encourage end-users to 
undertake this process (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). As a result changing of the password may 
be omitted by SoHo users leaving the device vulnerable. 
 
Since 2008, the number and sophistication of manufactured threats and identified 
vulnerabilities targeting ADSL routers has increased significantly. To date there are limited 
scholarly publications detailing the motives to compromise and control a router. As a 
general rule, ADSL routers are the first electronic device in a SoHo network. As a result, it is 
appealing for attackers to compromise and control a vulnerable router, compared to 
attempting to dominate internal hosts. Internal hosts may encompass the latest operating 
system updates, personal firewalls and anti-virus software. In contrast, SoHo or enterprise 
grade routers do not have methods by which to detect and/or remove malware or prevent 
security breaches from occurring. 
  
Typically an ADSL router is manufactured by vendors to be accessed through internal IP 
addresses only. However, emergent threats are compromising the device from external IP 
addresses. The default firmware on many first generation Netcomm routers, encompassed 
a web server flaw which permitted the device to be accessed, compromised and controlled 
via a host external to the network (Sajdak, 2009). In contrast, SourceSec (2010) has also 
developed and published a proof-of-concept tool designed to compromise D-Link ADSL 
routers from external IP addresses. The tool named “HNAP0wn” (Kirk, 2010) allows an un-
authenticated or un-privileged user to manipulate configuration settings on a range of D-
Link networking devices. In both of these cases, the intention behind the attack is to alter 
the configuration of the router to allow the controller to redirect traffic, and manipulate 
the devices behaviour – creating a zombie in a botnet farm. The botnet consisting of 
compromised hosts may be used to initiate subsequent Denial of Service attacks towards 
vulnerable hosts. 
 
Whilst ADSL routers are susceptible to manual attacks, automated worms are beginning to 
compromise SoHo based devices which encompass MIPS processor architectures. Forms of 
malware including “Psyb0t” (Baume, 2009; Hunt, 2009) and the “Chuck Norris” worm 
(McMillan, 2010) have been specifically designed to alter configuration settings through 
autonomous methods. The beneficial aspect of these two worms (for the attacker) is that 
an unsuspecting victim may download the malware onto their computer whilst on the 
Internet. To date anti-virus vendors are not openly admitting that they can actively detect 
and remove the worm from a workstation, resulting in a continuous re-infection to the 
router.  
 
Malware on ADSL routers tends to reside in Random Access Memory (RAM).  The simplest 
known method by which to remove malware is through a power-cycle process. This 
instruction is in most instances provided to end-users whom contact their ISP, in the event 
of the ADSL router malfunctioning. Unfortunately even if the malware is removed through 
a power cycle, the modified configuration settings will remain intact, and a re-infection, 
from the internal workstation is highly likely. This is due to the malware specimen residing 
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on the victim’s workstation, often undetected by anti-virus scanners. Psyb0t and the Chuck 
Norris worm both attempt to modify and fabricate configuration settings specific to the 
attacker’s requirements for control. 
 
THE NECESSITY FOR ADSL ROUTER FORENSICS 
Computer forensics is a discipline generally pertaining to the extraction of legal evidence 
from computers and digital storage mediums. Modern digital devices including computers, 
PDA, mobile phones and GPS devices have a reasonable amount of storage space and 
processing power. As a result, these mentioned devices may store a vast amount of media, 
files, and personally identifiable information. Unfortunately many ADSL routers are limited 
in storage and processing power. The D-Link DSL-G624T and Netgear DG834Gv4 
(OpenWRT, 2010) which are popular, high-end routers have at most four megabytes of 
flash coupled with sixteen megabytes of RAM. As a result the device in itself has few 
avenues to store potential evidence for law enforcement agencies to analyse and 
investigate. However, ADSL routers do encompass the entry and exit points to and from a 
network. By examining the configuration data, a forensic examiner may utilise the evidence 
to identify; where traffic is being transmitted, ports and services utilised to undertake 
further attacks, and other factors which may result in the device being abused by third 
parties. 
 
To date there are no commercially available products or methods by which to obtain and 
analyse evidence from ADSL routers. The field of ADSL router forensics is relatively new, 
although there is significant interest from law enforcement agencies. In 2009 a paper 
entitled “ADSL Router Forensics: Methods of Acquisition” (Szewczyk, 2009b) detailed a 
series of acquisition methods and explained the benefits of utilising Telnet, SSH, JTAG, and 
a serial approach to acquire data of interest. In 2010, the United States National Institute of 
Justice, specially funded a project to develop an automated process of acquiring evidence 
from ADSL routers (Router Marshal, 2010). Whilst the developers of Router Marshal do not 
justify the specific necessity for such software, it is claimed that there is a significant 
quantity of evidence to be obtained from an ADSL router utilised within a criminal case. 
 
ADSL router forensics may fall within the category of network forensics. However, ADSL 
routers encompass very limited storage. Hence, these devices generally lack the capability 
to monitor and store network activity – in the form of logs. The majority of ADSL routers do 
have a simplistic form of network logging capability. Unfortunately, none of the data is 
stored within the device itself. As a result the device must be configured to transmit the 
collected data to a specific host.  
 
As discussed previously, vendors are already manufacturing and shipping ADSL routers in a 
manner to ensure a trouble free experience for the end-user. As a result, the logging 
feature is disabled by default on all SoHo grade networking devices. An end-user would 
require a significant amount of expertise to create and maintain a workstation to collect 
and analyse the collected logs. An examination of the network activity logs that routers can 
generate in the event of an incident, are in themselves inadequate. The logging capability is 
not designed to record security breaches of incidents. The vast majority of exploits attempt 
to re-configure the ADSL router, hence the configuration data is most applicable in 
obtaining evidence of value for a forensic examiner.  
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Brown (2006) suggests that based on the threats currently targeting ADSL routers that the 
data that would be of most value in aiding a forensic investigation includes: 
 
 Firmware version – This aids in determining if the device in question is utilising an 
illegal or maliciously altered operating system. 
 
 System time – The ADSL router stores a simple yet effective log of significant system 
modifications. This may enable the forensic examiner to create a timeline of events 
which initiated or caused the crime to take place. 
 
 DNS address – Acquiring the DNS address may in-turn allow the investigator to 
determine if any redirection of traffic is occurring. 
 
 Wireless settings – Bandwidth theft is escalating due to insecure wireless access 
points. Acquiring the Media Access Control (MAC) allow and deny lists, encryption 
keys, and determining if the access point is enabled may allow the forensic 
examiner to construct a scenario of events to do with the wireless network. 
 
 Firewall rule sets – The ADSL router is pre-enabled with a set of firewall rule sets. 
Acquiring the current rules in place may aid in identifying how vulnerable the device 
in question was during an incident. 
 
 Remote management – Many attacks attempt to enable remote management to 
simplify the controlling process. Acquiring remote management settings may aid 
the investigator in identifying to whom the permission has been enabled. 
 
ADSL ROUTER FORENSICS 
The prevalent hardware structure of ADSL routers limits the number of accessible ports to 
the individual acquiring the evidence. This, in-turn, makes the process significantly more 
challenging as the device needs to be broken into, to physically make contact with the 
correct onboard interfaces. In addition ADSL routers are typically manufactured with 
soldered, on-board memory components which are cumbersome to remove, and may 
result in device malfunction due to improper handling. As a result investigating the device 
in a non-invasive manner is not always feasible. In “ADSL Router Forensics Part 2: Acquiring 
Evidence”, Szewczyk (2009a) demonstrates the two of methods by which data could be 
acquired from ADSL routers keeping in-line with digital forensic best practices. These 
methods are practically applied within the procedure, through the use of a Telnet or serial 
console approach. 
 
One of the limiting factors of acquiring data from ADSL routers is the fact that there is no 
cryptographic hashing software available on the device by default. This prevents the 
investigator from checking the integrity of the data before and after an acquisition has 
occurred. As a result this limits the soundness of the acquisition and instead relies on the 
precision of the method followed. To validate the integrity of the data acquired the serial 
and Telnet approach have been stress tested on a series of ADSL routers. The forensic 
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examiner could load pre-compiled software onto the ADSL router, and utilise the 
specialised software to create a hash digest of the evidence in question and subsequently 
transmit this evidence to a secondary storage medium or network path. This approach may 
not only overwrite existing data and alter configuration evidence, but may also bring the 
device to a halt due insufficient RAM and processor overload. 
 
According to the “Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence” (ACPO, 
2003) the number one principle of acquiring electronic evidence is “...no action... should 
change data held on a computer or storage media...” which based on the research to date 
has successfully demonstrated that utilising a serial or Telnet approach on ADSL routers has 
a continuous assurance on both the integrity of data repeatability factor. As a result, these 
approaches are in line with not modifying data on the electronic device being investigated. 
 
ACQUIRING EVIDENCE 
Unfortunately utilising a serial approach suffers from the problem of vendor’s failing to 
publicly release schematic diagrams and pin outs of their circuit boards. Generally the serial 
connection is utilised to monitor the networking state of an ADSL router by hobbyists and 
hackers. Hence, as the demand for methods and tools to monitor system status has 
increased, the open source development community has succeeded in identifying the serial 
ports on all ADSL router circuit boards. Upon connection of the serial cable and 
initialisation of the terminal software, the embedded system will continuously present data 
being processed by the system kernel. More importantly, the investigator may bypass this 
monitoring process, and directly interact with the ADSL router’s operating system. 
 
To validate the soundness and repeatability of the forensic approach, a series of empirical 
experiments have been conducted to verify and validate the suitability of the method to a 
D-Link and Netgear ADSL router. As part of the research process both of these units 
encompass the Texas Instruments AR7 solution chipset. This chipset is most commonly 
found within the majority of ADSL router products and has been utilised as the foundation 
for all forensic acquisitions. A series of steps have been generated to validate the 
acquisition process; 
 
1. To communicate with the serial console on the ADSL router, the investigator must 
have access to a specifically designed communication cable. The hardware cable 
was based on community forum recommendations. The resultant outcome follows 
the publicly available schematic as demonstrated in Figure 1 (AR7 Firmware, 2009).  
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Figure 1 Serial Console Hardware Schematic 
2. Upon following and constructing the schematic solutions from Figure 1, a device is 
constructed as per Figure 2. The devices produces input/output allowing an 
investigators workstation (via serial) to directly communicate with the onboard 
serial ports on the ADSL router. As per the diagram, the device encompasses a data 
transmission and receiving link, a 3.3 volt input link, and a ground link which are 
directly obtained from the ADSL router. 
 
 
Figure 2 Finalised Serial Console Hardware 
 
3. Both the D-Link G604t and Netgear DG834g were selected due to their market 
share and popularity amongst both retail chains and ISPs. Each of these devices was 
patched with the latest firmware directly available from the manufacturer’s 
website. This update was applied through the web management interface of the 
respectful product.  
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4. Each ADSL router was disassembled and the serial connectivity points were 
identified. The serial cable and hardware were connected to each ADSL router in-
turn and access via Putty. The serial client (PuTTy) must be configured to 
communicate with the ADSL router. The serial console settings include; 38,400 baud 
rate, no parity and flow control, eight (8) data bits and one (1) stop bit. 
 
5. The acquisition method was undertaken as discussed in “ADSL Router Forensics Part 
2: Acquiring Evidence” (Szewczyk, 2009). A baseline image of a default state of each 
ADSL router was acquired and hashed to produce an md5sum.  
 
This allows the configuration file to be examined to identify which processes, ports, 
services and functions are enabled and/or disabled as a result of third party device 
modification. The process of acquiring a baseline image was re-iterated through the 
serial based approach over a thirty cycle period. On each re-iteration the device was 
power cycled and a subsequent image generated. 
 
The evidence of this process has proven to provide a reliable image during each 
acquisition. The integrity of each of the acquisitions remained consistent, and the 
researcher had no reason to believe that the process was in any compromising the 
integrity of the data during the acquisition. It also became evident that the state of 
the configuration data is not modified as a result of a power-cycle or reset. This has 
significant bearing for a forensic examiner. Rather than an investigator having to 
acquire the device at the premises of occurrence, the device may in fact be seized, 
acquired and analysed at a remote location – if the configuration data is the only 
data of evidentiary value.  
 
6. To simulate a compromised router, the settings on the device were altered to 
mimic the characteristics of a device infected with malware. Specifically, the 
authentication credentials were altered, Telnet and web management disabled, a 
random assignment of ports were opened. 
 
7. The resultant state was that the ADSL router became inaccessible. Should a user 
attempt to utilise the web management facility this would result in inaccessible 
pages. Further to this, the Telnet facility had been disabled, thus preventing a 
forensic acquisition from occurring via the Telnet facility.  
 
Utilising the serial console approach, the device was responsive. Utilising the serial 
console approach described in previous research (Szewczyk, 2009a) the 
configuration data was successfully acquired. 
 
8. To validate the soundness of the approach, the process was repeated over a 30 
cycle period. In each instance the device was power cycled and a subsequent 
acquisition conducted. Whilst the device was un-responsive to the Telnet and web 
management approach in each of the acquisitions – the serial console approach 
continually proved to be successful. Further validating the process as a useful 
method by which to obtain data in future acquisitions. 
  Journal of Network Forensics 
 
 
 
Page 11 
 
EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 
On conclusion of each of the acquisitions an evidence.xml file is produced depicting the 
current state of the ADSL router. As it stands there are no elegant methods by which to 
interpret the data from within this file. Router Marshall (Router Marshal, 2010) appears to 
present data of evidentiary value in a reporting format. However, the file may still be 
examined and data of interest extracted by the forensic examiner.  
 
Figure 3 depicts a series of remote management services that could be enabled on an ADSL 
router. By default, the vendors tend to disable or restrict access to the remote 
management component of these devices. In the instance of remote configurations, the 
default state disabled is represented by a numerical “1”. In this particular instance the 
Telnet and SSH services have been disabled. However, based on the specific configuration 
of the ADSL router, the remote web management interface has been specifically enabled. 
As demonstrated by Figure 3, the state has transitioned to a numerical “0” resembling an 
enabled state.  
 
 
Figure 3 Remote Management Evidence 
As depicted by Figure 4, each configuration file has a populated list of MAC addresses 
specific to either wireless or wired Ethernet devices. In this particular instance a series of 
fictitious pre-populated MAC address for wireless devices were placed into the allow list 
utilising the web management facility of the device. As demonstrated in Figure 4, these 
MAC addresses are clearly evident and could be extracted for future analysis.  
 
 
Figure 4 MAC Address Allow List Evidence 
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The current state of the research is limited to the interpretation of evidence in relation to 
directly examining the evidence.xml file. As it stands each time the evidence file is 
extracted and converted from an ADSL router, there are approximately 2,600 lines of data 
for the forensic examiner to analyse. While the data is of a significant size, the examiner 
does have the opportunity to directly search through, and manipulate the configuration file 
to identify evidence of interest, pertaining to the legal case. 
 
Utilising the acquisition and analysis approaches discussed in this paper, ADSL routers are 
continually purchased from second hand sites such as eBay. Many end-users happily sell 
their networking devices. However, few to date, have removed their personal identity from 
these ADSL routers. From the series of second hand devices purchased – none of the 
devices had the Internet Service Provider’s account credentials removed. As a result it is 
simple to identify the ISP and the credentials the seller was utilising to access their 
broadband service. As many ISPs tend to link the broadband credentials directly to an email 
or administration account, is it evident that the information could be utilised for malicious 
purposes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The value of ADSL router forensics will be increasingly important as the number of threats 
targeting these simplistic devices escalates. The method described within this paper is 
fundamentally important for investigating the effects of malware on ADSL routers. Each 
time the “Psyb0t” or “Chuck Norris” malware infects a vulnerable device, the device 
initiates a lock-out state. A traditional inspection of the device would be defunct in that the 
ports required to access the device through Telnet, SSH or via the web management 
interface are blocked as part of the malwares characteristics. Fortunately the malware has 
no method by which to block the serial console access. As a result an investigator may 
utilise the approach discussed in this paper whilst still acquiring evidence pertaining to the 
compromised state of the device which is still operating the specific botnet.  
 
The future of this research will attempt to examine the feasibility of utilising non-solder 
based contact points on the board of the ADSL router. As with the majority of ADSL routers, 
there are no actual headers located on any of the boards. As a result each device is 
prepared through soldering on of a header specific to the JTAG or serial connection to be 
utilised. This of course would not be a practical method by which to make connectivity in a 
real life situation and as a result an alternative approach must be investigated to identify 
suitable approaches to making contact with the appropriate access interfaces. 
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Abstract 
With the world getting more and more digitized, social networking has also found a place in 
the cyber world. These social networking sites (SNSs) which enable people to socialize, and 
build and maintain relationships are attracting attention of all kinds of people such as 
teens, adults, sports persons, and even businesses. But these SNSs are also getting 
unwanted attention from people like sexual predators, spammers, and people involved in 
criminal and illegal activities. This paper talks about SNSs and how these sites are exploited 
for criminal or illegal activity. The SNSs are discussed in detail with respect to user profiles, 
user networks, and privacy and security with respect to these user accounts. The paper also 
talks about the way available data on these SNSs can be exploited. The paper concludes 
with a few real life recent criminal cases associated with these SNSs. 
 
Keywords 
social networking, social networking sites, Facebook, MySpace, online predators, phishing, 
social networking crime, social networking models 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the Internet, it is now very easy to be connected to a number of people, 
groups, and communities which was not this easily possible before the Internet was widely 
available. The Internet gave rise to online social networking which is mostly done via the 
use of social networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Friendster to 
name a few among the many available SNSs. Today, online social networking has become 
such a huge phenomenon, that Twitter was declared the most popular English word of 
2009 (Parr, 2009). Facebook, one of the social networking sites, ranks third in the overall 
web traffic in the United States with over 104.2 million users per month (Quantcast, 
2009a). MySpace, another social networking site ranks tenth in the overall United States 
web based traffic with over 55.8 million users per month (Quantcast, 2009b). Online Social 
Networking has become so much part of our daily lives that it is not uncommon to keep all 
our contacts posted of what we are doing, if not every minute, but everyday of our life. 
Social Networking has become a powerful tool for businesses and other things like even 
the 2008 Presidential Election. 
 
The basic purpose of these SNSs is online interaction and communication and maintaining 
relationships. SNSs have various models, but the most common model is to present a 
person’s profile and to visualise the person’s network of contacts to other people (Gross & 
Acquisti, 2005). These SNSs allow people to put all kinds of personal information on their 
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website. When people join these social networking sites, they have to create their personal 
profile. This profile contains information such as name, which could be real or pseudo, date 
of birth, address, hometown, gender, ethnicity, religion, spouse’s information, workplace 
details, school details, and the person’s personal interest. This profile could also include 
photographs, videos, and personal messages. Other members can connect by sending 
friend requests or messages. When a person is added to the contact list or the friend list, 
this person gets the privilege to access the friend’s profile and all the personal information 
put on this profile. These SNSs also have the privacy option wherein the profile user can 
hide all of the available personal information from other users except their friends in the 
friend list, that is, users who are directly connected to the profile owner. Even with all this 
available privacy, users are least bothered about their profile privacy and are happy to 
share all the personal information with the online world.  
 
With such personal information as name, address, date of birth, gender, information on 
children, personal messages like updates, and photos made easily available by the users 
themselves, it is easy for criminals to gain access to this information. But as per these SNSs 
models, these criminals also get access to the directly connected contacts of the user. 
These criminals are commonly referred to as “Online Predators”. This paper focuses on 
three popular social networking sites in the United States, namely, Facebook, MySpace, 
and Twitter. The paper will describe social networking and its history, and then will 
describe the above-mentioned three sites in detail concerning the user profile, content, 
and privacy. It will then describe the possible use of these sites by online predators to 
conduct their criminal activities. 
SOCIAL NETWORKING: EVOLUTION 
Until the 1990s, Internet was not so widely and commercially available to the common 
public. As Internet started becoming more available and more popular, people started 
viewing it as a useful and commercial application. This was the evolution of online social 
networking. But does it mean that people did not socially connect to each other before the 
Internet boom? Human being, in itself is called a social animal. Social networks have been 
studied and analysed for a long time now. This analysis of social networks is useful in 
studies of kinship structure, social mobility, science citations, contacts between members 
of deviant groups, corporate power, international trade exploitation, class structure, and 
many other areas (Scott, 1998). Internet was a revolution; similar to how telephone was a 
revolution. As social networking is nothing but maintaining relationships and building new 
relations, before the advent of the Internet, people used simple methods like snail mail, 
telegrams, telephones and even actually physically meeting each other to maintain and 
build new contacts.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a form of social networking called the Bulletin Board System or 
simply BBS was popular. Here people could send text messages and the BBS ran over the 
telephone lines (Gigaom, 2008). The first site that could be called as a social networking 
site came into being in 1997. This was the start of online social networking with 
SixDegrees.com coming into existence. Users were able to create profiles and list friends 
using SixDegrees. By 1998, users could also search for friends on SixDegrees. SixDegrees 
promoted itself as a tool where people could connect with each other and send messages 
  Journal of Network Forensics 
 
 
 
Page 16 
 
to each other. But SixDegrees failed as a business and in 2000 was finally closed (Boyd & 
Ellison, 2007). In 2002, social networking sites finally started blossoming with the 
introduction of Friendster. MySpace was introduced in 2003, while Facebook was open to 
the general public in 2006. Twitter was also launched in 2006 (Nickson, 2009). Thus started 
a new age of social networking that we have now come to know.  
USER PROFILE CONTENT OF THE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE 
As stated earlier, this paper concentrates on the three most popular social networking sites 
in the US, namely, Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter. An account was specifically created for 
the purpose of this paper on each of these sites. While Facebook and MySpace have more 
fields as compared to Twitter, all these sites ask for information like name, birth date, 
photograph, hometown to just name a few. Compared to Facebook and MySpace, Twitter 
has more concentration on “chat” for social networking. Facebook and MySpace are more 
oriented towards maintaining and building new relationships. The amount of personal 
information that could be put up while creating a user profile on Facebook and MySpace is 
astounding. Apart from the fields mentioned earlier, a user could put in information like 
gender, sexual orientation, relationship status, movie or music taste, biological data to 
name a few. Appendix 1 lists and compares all the available fields related to a user profile 
on all the three sites.  
 
With all this data relating to personal information available on the Internet, privacy is now 
a huge concern. Most of the user profile fields on these sites have an option of visibility. 
This means that the user can decide if the specific content should be available to everyone 
on the network (here network means the entire SNS network) or just the user’s personal 
network of friends. Even with all this form of privacy available, users tend to keep their 
profiles open to everyone. This has created a huge security concern as crimes related to 
these SNSs started rising. These crimes could be anything from cyberstalking, social 
phishing to sexual assault. These sites are even referred to as “Predators Playground” 
(Schrobsdorff, 2007). 
OPERATION OF THE SITES AS A SOCIAL NETWORK 
Social networking works in the same way as computer networks. One user is directly 
connected to a number of users namely contacts or friends and these friends are in turn 
connected to other contacts. This forms a kind of web or mesh where users act as nodes 
and every node has multiple branches, which are the user’s contacts. 
 
Since every user on these SNSs is unique, the amount of information put out by each user 
is different. The way these users behave online is hard to define, but this behavior 
generates out of trust. Fukuyama, and Lewis and Weigert in their respected papers (as 
cited in Dwyer, Hiltz, & Passerini, 2007) discuss that trust is a critical determinant in 
personal or face to face relationships. Similarly, Coppola, Hiltz, and Rotter, Jarvenpaa and 
Leidner, Meyerson, and Piccoli and Ives in their respective papers (as cited in Dwyer, Hiltz, 
& Passerini, 2007) discuss that trust is also important for successful online interactions. 
Metzger in her paper write that(as cited in Dwyer, Hiltz, & Passerini, 2007) trust is a 
precondition for disclosure in interpersonal exchange situations, because of the reduced 
perceived risks which are involved while revealing private information (Dwyer et al. 2007). 
 
  Journal of Network Forensics 
 
 
 
Page 17 
 
From the above arguments it can be said that relationships on these sites will not be built 
without trust. To build up a relationship, the user generally adds other users as their 
friends only if they know each other, even though it was a very brief interaction. The way 
these SNSs’ networks work, once a person is being added into the friend list, this person 
can access all the information of the user including the users other contacts. This way, it 
will not be very difficult for an online predator to gain trust of an individual by employing 
the briefest of interactions and once added to the friend/contact list, exploit this 
individual’s personal data and also maybe search for other potential victims through the 
now open medium of “Friend List”. Crime via social networking is increasing rapidly and 
criminals are now viewing these SNSs as a tool for committing crimes. If the user account is 
not open to everyone, the key point of the user information being available for exploitation 
lies in gaining trust and access to the user profile via Friend/Contact List.  
FINDING THE USER INFORMATION FOR EXPLOITATION 
There are many ways of finding the user information. The user itself can be found by doing 
a simple search in search engines like Google or Bing. There are certain privacy features 
available for users of the SNSs that allow the users to not be found via the search engines. 
This is called profile searchability. Online predators do not search explicitly for users this 
way. They prefer to contact potential targets as a user of the SNS. Wolak, Finkelhor, and 
Mitchell in their paper write that online predators prefer to meet and seduce their victims 
online. They also say that majority of the victims are aware that they are conversing with 
an adult (Wolak et al. 2008). In a social phishing study conducted by Jagatic, Johnson, 
Jakobsson, and Menczer, they found out that students readily give university information 
to a non-university party. They say that a phisher can mine information about relationships 
via social networking sites. For this study, Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, and Menczer used 
freely available user profile data from SNSs for the phishing attack. This data appeared to 
originate from a friend on the network. They found that the targets were much more likely 
to disclose personal information to friends than strangers (Jagatic et al. 2005).  
 
So how much information is easily available? Acquisti and Gross in their study found that 
Facebook users have more trust in the Facebook privacy settings. These users are not much 
concerned about the information in itself as they think that they can control the 
information and the privacy controls as to who can view the data. They found out that 
users are also mildly concerned about who can access their personal data. Another 
interesting thing Acquisti and Gross found in their study was that users of Facebook, 
trusted the system and its members more than compared to MySpace (Acquisti & Gross, 
2006).  
 
With the users having this attitude towards privacy and trust, with respect to both the SNS 
and the users in the contact list, it is very easy for online predators to gain access to 
personal information of the users or for phishers to use phishing methods to collect 
personal data.  
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
SNSs have a lot of privacy features. Users have control over who can search their profile 
called the profile searchability or who can view their profile called profile visibility. A user’s 
direct network of contacts has exclusive privilege of viewing all of the users content such as 
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the message posts by the user and by user’s other contacts on the user’s profile. These 
direct contacts have access to all of the user’s photos, videos, list of the communities, 
friend/contact lists. These users however, cannot see the messages/mail communication 
between the user and the user’s other contacts.  
 
The privacy issue arises when some user content is seen or accessed by unintended people. 
This occurs when “friends of friends” or secondary contacts can view the user’s content like 
photos, and videos. A user can be connected to thousands of secondary users or the 
friends of friends and this potentially increases the risk of personal information being 
available to users who are not even in the contact/friend list of the user. Acquisti and Gross 
in their paper write that an online social network lists hundreds of direct contacts/friends 
and include hundreds and thousands of additional contacts which are just three degrees of 
seperation from the subject (Gross & Acquisti, 2005).  
 
With these statistics it is very easy to cross reference a particular user via the open 
friends/contacts channel. If an online predator gained the trust of a teen and gets added to 
that teen’s contact/friend list, this opens a big window for this online predator to search 
for potential victims via this teen’s friend/contact list. This predator will also have access to 
the teens photos and from there access to any open profiles as well as photos, videos, and 
personal information of the teen’s other contacts, which essentially become the predator’s 
secondary contacts. 
Phishers work in different way. They gain unauthorised access into a users account and 
start sending spam to the user’s direct contacts. These messages could be anything like the 
Nigerian Scam or appear to come from the user and ask to fill information on a third party 
network or could be even a virus which infects the machine if the link to it is clicked. SNSs 
are opening new doors for phishers and scammers. One can become a member of these 
SNSs very easily. Also, most of these sites lack basic security measures like SSL logins. This 
makes it easy for hackers to access the user data without the site’s direct collaboration 
(Gross & Acquisti, 2005).  
EXAMINING THE SNSS FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES 
With the vast amount of data that is readily available on the SNSs, similar to criminals, 
investigators can also use this data for investigative purposes. The ways of finding user 
information for investigative purposes is very much similar to what the criminals use. For 
investigative purposes, a specific user will be targeted to gather information from. 
Shoemaker in her paper (as cited in Lampe, Ellison & Steinfield, 2006) write about a 
function called ‘surveillance’ which allows an individual to track the actions, beliefs and 
interests of the larger group, to which they belong to (Lampe et al. 2006). Lampe et al. 
classified this type of surveillance by the goals of users as ‘social searching’ or ‘social 
browsing’. Social searching is where the site is specifically used to investigate specific 
people. Social browsing helps to find people or groups with whom the individual wants to 
connect offline (Lampe et al. 2006). Social searching is the type of surveillance that 
investigators use as they target specific individuals to gather information. 
 
Just like normal people, criminals tend to keep their profiles open to public. Some criminals 
go as far as to put status updates about the crimes they have commited. Investigators can 
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use these SNSs to verify an alibi, or to even just check up the profile of the particular 
individual. SNSs are used by the investigators as form of  resource. They use these sites 
more reactively rather than proactively (Klein, 2008).  Apart from investigators, people like 
insurance adjustors, insurance attorneys, prosecutors, defense attorneys are also taking 
help of the SNSs to check out their clients or their witnesses (McKinney, 2010).   
SOME CYBER CRIME CASES INVOLVING THE SNSS 
With the increase in popularity of the SNSs among general public, there is also an increase 
of popularity of these SNSs among criminals. These SNSs have actually opened a lot of 
doors for the crime world and the way crimes are committed. Now-a-days, reports of lots 
of criminal activities involving the SNSs can be heard. Facebook and MySpace are especially 
popular in this area. A few cases relating to SNS are listed below. 
   
Recently in the news was John Forehand, who was arrested for allegedly asking his teen 
daughter for sex over Facebook. John Forehand started communicating with his teen 
daughter over Facebook. He then told her that he was having inappropriate dreams about 
her and then proposed sex with her via posting graphic details of the activity on her 
Facebook account (The Huffington Post, 2009). In this particular case, the teen daughter 
added John Forehand to her contacts/friend list, as she must have trusted him since he was 
her father. If we can call John Forehand a predator, then the daughter’s other teen 
contacts could be considered potential victims. John Forehand had easy entry in any open 
accounts via his daughter’s contact/friend list. 
 
In another case, a man named Robert A. Wise was arrested on charges of online solicitation 
of a minor. Wise was sending explicitly sexual messages to a teenage girl via MySpace. 
After being contacted the police posed as the 14 year old girl on MySpace and via the 
MySpace chat arranged a meeting with him. When Wise came to meet the girl at a 
prearranged spot, he was arrested. The cops also found online evidence against Wise to 
charge him with the sexual assault of another 14-year-old girl he had allegedly met on 
MySpace (Schrobsdorff, 2007). In yet another case a Houston man was arrested with sexual 
assault of a child. This 15 year old teen had been communicating with this man on MySpace 
and had actually snuck out of the house to meet him in person (Schrobsdorff, 2007). 
 
In yet another incident, Emily Mayhan, a 20 year old Facebook user found that her 
Facebook account had been hijacked and the password to the account changed due to 
which she could not access the account. After that several of the contacts in her friend list 
started getting messages stating that she was stranded in London without cash and in 
urgent need of cash. Facebook closed her account on account of suspicious activity after a 
few days but no action was taken on the incident. According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), this is a case of online hoax or phishing, which takes place for identity 
theft or for financial information (Davis, 2009). 
 
In yet another phishing scam on Facebook, Bryan Rutberg’s Facebook account had been 
hacked into and messages appearing from him were being posted saying that he is in 
urgent need of help. Many of his contacts also received emails saying he had been robbed 
at gunpoint while travelling in the United Kingdom and he was in need of money. Rutberg 
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was locked out of his own account and the scammer had even removed his wife from his 
contact list. The account was de-activated after about 24 hours (Sullivan, 2009).  
 
And lastly but not the least, “Spam King” Sanford Wallace was sued by Facebook for 
accessing users’ accounts without their permission and then sending phony messages and 
posts. Facebook claimed that Wallace used phishing sites or other similar means to 
fraudulently gain access to Facebook accounts of the users. After that, he used these 
accounts to distribute phishing spam throughout the network (cnet, 2009). Wallace was 
also charged and fined for the MySpace case in 2008 where he sent junk messages to the 
MySpace users (USA Today, 2009).  
CONCLUSION 
While social networking sites are a good way of maintaining relationships and building new 
relationships, a user should be always aware of the existing dangers of using these sites. 
With the high amount of personal data put on these sites, there is always a risk of this data 
being exploited. Even with the use of privacy settings, the data is easily accessed through 
an open account or even through a closed account. Howsoever innocent the personal data 
is, online predators are always watching and users are targeted via phishing.  
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1. APPENDIX 
1.1 User Profile Fields for Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter 
Facebook MySpace Twitter 
Name/alias Name/alias Name/alias 
Photograph Photograph Photograph 
Networks  Lists 
Sex Sex  
Birthday Birthday  
Sexual orientation Sexual orientation  
Hometown Hometown Location 
Relationship status Relationship status  
Friends list Friends List Followers/Following/Lists 
Political views   
Religious views Religious views  
Activities   
Interests   
Musical taste Musical taste  
Television taste Television taste  
Movie taste Movie taste  
Books taste Books taste  
Quotations   
Email address(es)  Email address 
Telephone number(s)   
Instant messenger 
ID(s) 
  
Educational history Educational history  
Employment history Employment history  
Group affiliations Networking Categories  
Photo albums Photo albums  
 Blog entries Link to online Bio 
 Personal 'about me' entry  
 Personal heroes  
 'Who I'd like to meet'  
 Zodiac sign  
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 Parental status  
Online status Online status  
Chat 'wall', including 
time of post 
Chat 'comments', including 
date and time of post 
Chat 'tweets', including 
date and time of post 
 Income  
 Country  
 Postal Code  
 State  
Videos Videos  
 Intentions (dating, 
relationships, friendship, 
networking) 
 
 Height  
 Body Type  
 Drinker  
 Smoker  
 Ethnicity  
  Time Zone 
 
1.2 Some Recommended Safety Guidelines for Users of SNSs 
 Always be aware that any content once put on the Internet always stays there even though 
it appears to be deleted. 
 Always be aware of the content put out on the SNSs. 
 Always use the available privacy features on the SNS. Do not leave the user profile open to 
be accessed by everyone. 
 Do not accept friend/contact requests from unknown people. 
 Think twice before putting any information on the SNSs. 
 Avoid putting photos that might attract unwanted attention from any online predators. 
 Avoid putting detailed information of oneself as well as family members like spouses, 
children, and parents. 
 Be aware of any phishing content that might appear to be posted by any of the friends. 
 Always be aware of the risks of social networking and different uses of SNSs.  
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Abstract 
Online social networking websites' popularity have grown to the point that hundreds of 
millions of users have joined in order to make connections to others. Through these sites' 
information sharing nature, investigators can discover real world relationships and relevant 
personal information or activities. The purpose of this paper is to present a literature review 
regarding the nature of online relationships, investigative uses of social networking 
websites, the types of information available, and some usage examples. It was found that 
the sites can be a valuable resource for intelligence gathering, and that additional 
investigation into tools or methods to facilitate information gathering is warranted. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the growth of Internet availability and the subsequent opportunities and methods for 
communication have increased, people have started using online social networking 
websites as a supplement for face to face socialising. The use of these sites to build online 
representations of real-world acquaintance networks (Lampe, Ellison, & Steinfield 2006), or 
supplementing existing interpersonal relationships has driven the explosive growth of 
social networking websites in the past decade. As increasing numbers of people interact on 
these sites, more and more information about them is requested and collected, often with 
privacy being an afterthought. Personally identifiable information such as digital 
photographs, relationship status, friend lists, chats, marital status, birth date, political and 
religious leanings, as well as tastes in the arts and group affiliations can be revealed 
(Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009), (Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Additional information can be 
directly accessed or inferred by viewing digital photos, videos, or chat postings which may 
document actions, statements, or locations. Additionally, observation of these sites shows 
that many activities, such as posting comments or photographs are time stamped. Often 
through default privacy settings, much of this wealth of information is readily accessible, 
possibly even by those not directly a member of an individual's social network (Stutzman, 
2006).  
 
When one thinks of an online investigation, often the image of an investigator observing or 
covertly interacting with an online user comes to mind. Many times this investigative target 
is an individual seeking to build an online relationship or disclose information with a 
stranger in a semi-anonymous environment, something McKenna, Green, and Gleason 
(2009) described as "strangers on a train". Instead of seeking or interacting with strangers, 
what happens if the interactions are explicitly among individuals who already know each 
other and wish not only to simply connect but do so in an environment that collects 
information? This building of an online acquaintance directory of sorts, and the ability to 
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browse and connect with people is the basis for social networking websites usefulness, 
from a participant's perspective. In nearly the same manner as users browse for people on 
these sites, so too can investigators navigate the links between people in order to perform 
reconnaissance (Read, 2006). 
 
Research by Bargh, McKenna and Fitzsimons (2002) has shown that in general, online 
relationships are perhaps more rapidly and strongly formed than normal social interactions 
due to facilitating aspects such as implied anonymity or a sense of enhanced self-
expression. While social networking sites do promote online relationships, and searching 
for contact with strangers can occur, the main use is more novel. This additional use is to 
build or supplement real-world links, however tenuous, to others already known. Instead 
of seeking relationships with strangers, Lampe, Ellison, & Steinfield (2006) described the 
term "social searching" or "social browsing" to describe the acts of browsing the social 
networking website mappings of these real-world links in order to find acquaintances. 
These browsing functions involve the viewing of social network profiles for the purpose of 
following people's life activities, or to gather more information or intelligence about friends 
and acquaintances. 
  
All of this information about a participant's identity and life, which they choose to share, 
and which is neatly and often publicly compiled by these sites, can be used by law 
enforcement or the legal or intelligence community. These investigators can browse and 
search for links between people in a similar manner to the way social searching is done by 
the users of these websites. Additionally, users and investigators can similarly use the sites 
to gather information on individuals, determine social connections and mutual friendships, 
and follow activities. For this paper, online social networking will be described in general 
terms, but for specific examples three popular US social networking sites will be discussed: 
Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter. Additionally, the possible advantages of using social 
networking sites to supplement investigative sources, and descriptions of the types of 
information available on each will be presented. This mapping of potential information is a 
first step in providing investigators an index of potentially available information. This is 
useful, as the more personally identifiable information that can be gathered, the more 
likely a person can be matched to this information (Gross & Acquisti 2005). 
SOCIAL NETWORKING BACKGROUND 
The concept of a social network as a way to define and study interpersonal relationships is 
not a new one. Sociologists have long used social networks and social network analysis as a 
way to study interactions and relationships among groups of people, and it has been a well-
researched field since at least the 1930s (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Specifically, law 
enforcement has long realised that the use of social network analysis techniques could 
benefit investigations by mapping ties between individuals in order to determine 
relationships (Davis, 1981). Note that sociology defines a social network somewhat 
differently and in a more formal manner, in order to perform statistical analysis, express 
relations mathematically, or generate theories on interactions (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).  
In the context of this paper, social networking is defined as the interactions and web of 
relationships that are facilitated by websites created specifically for information sharing 
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among a community of members who are linked by characteristics such as location, 
affiliations, friendships, families, et cetera.  
 
How did people keep track of friends and acquaintances before computers, the Internet, 
and specifically social networking websites? The answer is well known, as pre-Internet 
people kept track of friends and acquaintances through face to face interactions and by 
using available media technologies of the time, such as written word, telephones, and so 
on. In reality, social networking websites are performing a similar role as a communications 
medium. Combined with the specific qualities of online interactions, social networking 
websites can affect how relationships are formed and information is disclosed.  
Additionally, the increasingly public nature of disclosure further influences how the 
information can be accessed (Gross & Acquisti 2005).  
 
Boyd and Ellison (2007) outline the history and growth of social networking sites, from the 
creation of the first dedicated online social networking website, sixdegrees.com, in 1997. 
Since that time, twenty-five individual sites have been created or re-launched, many even 
between 2003 through 2007 (Boyd & Ellison 2007). The growth of these sites can be 
demonstrated partially by comparing the membership of Facebook, which Gross and 
Acquisti (2005) estimated to be around 2.4 million in 2005, to a statement from Facebook's 
founder in September, 2009 that his site now claims three hundred million members. This 
is a massive number, but definitely not the end of growth for the site, as Facebook's stated 
goal is to "connect everyone" (Zuckerberg, 2009).  
GENERAL NATURE OF ONLINE SOCIAL INTERACTION 
The nature of online social interactions also affects the uses of online social networking 
and also influences tendencies to share information or form relationships. There is no set 
of rules for how people interact online, however some recurring characteristics have been 
identified. 
Anonymous Environments 
One factor is that anonymous, or perceived anonymous environments, including social 
networking websites can promote the expression of a true self which can influence a 
person to express ideas or opinions that may not otherwise be accepted in normal society 
(Acquisti & Gross, 2006), (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002), (McKenna, Green & 
Gleason, 2009). For an investigator, this implies that users of social networking websites 
may be more prone to express thoughts or opinions that they may normally withhold in 
real world interpersonal interactions.  
Formation of Relationships 
Another influencing factor of online social interactions is that the formations of 
relationships can be facilitated. Some people are simply more comfortable being 
themselves online than in face-to-face situations. Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons (2002) 
found through experimentation that online relationships, and specifically the openness of 
sharing personal information, can depend first on if a participant 'likes' the other person or 
not. While this initial barrier exists, once openness occurs, online relationships can be built 
much faster than real world ones. While this poses an initial hurdle to an investigator, it is 
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similar to building trust with a subject of an investigation or interview. The benefit of being 
able to quickly connect with people online also has obvious implications for saving time. 
 
Openness and fast relationship building can be an advantage to an investigator and apply in 
general to online interaction, but the fact still remains that most users of social networking 
websites will only connect with people they already know, at least in some manner (Lampe, 
Ellison, & Steinfield, 2006)(Adamic & Adar, 2005). It may only take a brief meeting in a 
class, or at a conference, or on the street, but for most users of these sites, acceptance into 
their network may require at least minimal "real-world" interaction.  
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE PROFILE CONTENT 
Currently in the United States the three social networking sites given the most attention 
are Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter. As stated previously, many people use these sites, 
especially Facebook and MySpace, to supplement, build, or extend existing relationships 
with family, friends, coworkers and acquaintances (DiMicco & Millen, 2007), (Lampe, 
Ellison, & Steinfield, 2007). While Twitter contains similar profile elements, it has many less 
profile fields compared to Facebook or MySpace at the time of this writing, as exhibited in 
Appendix A. 
 
As asserted previously, there is a wealth of personal information on these sites, but what 
exactly is available? For each of the three sites, an account was created and the available 
fields to complete a profile were observed. Appendix A details the names of some of the 
fields available to be filled out in a user's profile. While sites use varying terminology, 
analogous entries are listed on the same row. Even though these fields represent the 
defaults available for a profile on the social networking website, this information, and 
much more can be disclosed through the openness of chat posting on a profile. In other 
words, there is no restriction as to what a user can enter into their profile, chat about, or 
post to other's profiles. One could say that this profile information is just the starting point 
of what is potentially available. 
VIRTUALLY LOCATING THE SOCIAL NETWORK PARTICIPANT 
Using Open Privacy Settings 
If the user of a social networking site leaves their privacy settings open, then anyone can 
use that website's search feature to locate them, primarily based on name, known friends, 
or other profile information. Additionally, these open profiles are often indexed by Internet 
search engines, which allow all content of the profile to be searched. Essentially, to find 
any participant, the same techniques that people intuitively use when searching for their 
friends is used. There really isn't a high-tech methodology to locating someone, rather it is 
by using existing online search methods that people may be found. 
Exploring Known Relationships 
Another method to find individual profiles is to explore known relationships of the target, 
usually provided in some manner by the sites, and note common friends. To most 
investigators, it is common sense to cross reference people who are friends or 
acquaintances with an investigative target. However, there are some surprises to this 
method. As described by Adamic and Adar (2005), so-called "short paths" exist in the 
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degrees of separation among people, and these short paths are often facilitated by well 
connected individuals with many members in their personal networks. (Adamic & Adar 
2005) demonstrated that with personal network memberships of three hundred, it would 
be possible to link any two people in the country in three intermediary relationships. This 
implies that it may be possible to discover connections to an investigative target that may 
not have otherwise been easily detectable.  Finally, Adamic and Adar (2005), explain that 
by narrowing down similar traits, or in a social networking terms, profile elements, 
navigation of a broad social network to an individual can be accomplished. In a sense, this 
is the same concept as matching enough data points to find an exact person, assuming 
each person has at least one unique characteristic. 
 
In a practical sense, searching for a person means starting with what information is known, 
mapping that to profile fields, and searching along those traits. For example, if the target of 
an investigation liked a certain movie or musical act, there is a chance that they would 
somehow be associated or linked to related content on the social networking site. The end 
result could then be to gain access to the target's profile , at least to a degree at which the 
target's personal information is viewable and less restricted by privacy controls (Gross & 
Acquisti, 2005). This can depend on many factors, but mainly group or network 
memberships and privacy settings. 
CORRELATION OR INFERENCE OF INFORMATION 
Some information may not be explicit in the profile, or the profile may not be accessible. 
However, useful information can still be obtained from these sites. For example, if a target 
is not a user of a social networking site they may, for example, attend a birthday party of a 
friend or relative who is a user of these sites. Often these events or activities are 
documented through video, photography, or depicted through text describing the event. 
This is important because even if a person doesn’t participate on a social networking site, it 
seems plausible that at least some of their friends or family or classmates or coworkers do. 
It is then possible that participants may post this information which may have content 
including the non-participating individual, though the reliability of this method was not 
determined in this research. This hypothetical example is where the power of the 
popularity of social network sites may be able to play a huge role.  In these instances the 
tendency to post online about people with whom there are real-world connections, even if 
the second party doesn’t participate, benefits the investigator. Many people who do not 
use or object to using these sites may not realise that non-participation is not a guarantee 
that information about them is exempt from being disclosed. Additionally, given that the 
number of degrees or hops between people can be surprisingly small (Adamic & Adar, 
2005), it may be possible to find content in unexpected places.  
 
Other data may also be inferred. For example, a target could post to their profile that they 
attended a movie with two friends. This post will more than likely have a timestamp, and 
possibly a method of posting, such as from a mobile phone as described in Appendix A. 
With this information, it may be possible to infer the time and location, as well as the 
activities of the target. Even if one such post does not provide all of this information, 
observing several posts can lead to a pattern of activities. For example, if a target often 
posts on Mondays that they are going to a local bar to watch football, one could safely 
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assume that they could be found there on a subsequent Monday around a certain time. 
These hypothetical examples go to illustrate not just that the sites contain useful data, but 
that correlating the same data could possibly provide insights or information that wasn't 
explicitly divulged.  
PRIVACY CONTROLS ON CONTENT 
Each of the sites provides an outlet for a user to interact with their friends, acquaintances, 
or the public. At the same time these interactions are happening in an increasingly public 
sense. For instance, conversations that may have taken place over emails or SMS messages 
may now appear on users' profiles or chat space, which at a minimum are viewable by their 
first-degree circle of linked relationships, and potentially open to the world if privacy 
controls are lax or not applied. This can be equated to the information sharing properties 
of the sites and users' propensity to post information openly as described by Gross and 
Acquisti (2005). 
 
Each of these sites is allowing unprecedented access to view relationships, opinions, 
actions, and anything else a person may be inclined to disclose, and as demonstrated 
previously may in fact be more apt to do so. By their design and nature these sites are set 
up for the sharing of information and therefore the privacy controls are weaker than one 
may expect (Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Additionally, Acquisti and Gross (2006) stated findings 
that privacy concerns over a particular site do not necessarily deter participation.  
 
Although the privacy implications of these sites is beyond the scope of this paper, one 
interesting consequence of the openness of these sites is that data leakage through 
advertisements, website applications, and games could potentially provide a vector for 
access to profile information (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009). For example, Krishnamurthy 
and Wills (2009) found that advertising referrer headers contained user IDs and friend 
information, regardless of privacy control settings. These demonstrated "leaks" of 
information imply that it may be possible for a 3rd party to obtain much profile information 
simply by having a user view an advertisement. Combine this with the amount of targeted 
advertising on these sites and in some cases built in advertising tools, the potentials for 
access becomes apparent. 
BENEFITS TO AN INVESTIGATOR 
There are several ways in which using social networking sites can benefit an investigation 
or intelligence gathering. First and perhaps surprisingly, non-participants information may 
still exist on a participating friends' profile. Additionally, searches of these sites can reveal 
real-world relationships which can potentially be discovered much faster than traditional 
methods. Novel relationships can be discovered through short paths, and may provide 
contacts for questioning that may not have been found otherwise.  
 
Although Acquisti and Gross (2006) argue that usefulness to those outside a network will 
predictably diminish as users learn about privacy controls, it is still trivial to become a 
participant, and the research by Krishnamurthy & Wills (2009) indicates that privacy 
controls may not play as large a factor as is perceived.  
 
  Journal of Network Forensics 
 
 
 
Page 31 
 
Another investigative benefit, implied in the research by Lampe, Ellison & Steinfield (2007) 
found that at Michigan State only 3% of Facebook users felt that law enforcement or 
school administration were actively viewing profiles. This could be compared to the feeling 
of anonymity, and may promote a more cavalier attitude in disclosing information on illicit 
acts. 
 
Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009) also suggest that data remnants of social network browsing 
should specifically be targeted in the forensic investigation of a seized computer. This 
implies that the data in a profile is not just limited to the website, but is useful even 
beyond intelligence gathering and may play an additional evidentiary role. 
 
Another interesting application could be to use so-called crowdsourcing techniques, which 
would allow an investigation to leverage the participants to find fugitives or possibly 
missing persons in much the same way that television and Amber Alerts are used to notify 
people of situations and encourage their assistance.  
 
Gross and Acquisti (2005) stated that the use of face recognition in searches could 
potentially be used to find people in digital photographs on these sites. 
 
As discussed previously, the nature of these sites means that people may be more prone to 
build relationships or divulge information more readily than in face to face interactions. 
Additionally, in real world covert investigations, targets may expect to be able to connect 
on a social networking site, and not doing so may be suspicious to the target of the 
investigation or detrimental in forming a relationship. This is inferred from the fact that 
participants in social networking prefer to connect with people they already know(Lampe, 
Ellison & Steinfield, 2006). 
EXAMPLES OF USE OF ONLINE CONTENT IN INVESTIGATIONS 
Although it seems that news reports of the use of social networking sites in criminal or 
administrative investigations occurs almost daily, a few examples of recent uses provides 
some context into how the sites can be used: 
 
Recently, in Clark v. State of Indiana (2009) an Indiana appeals court found that evidence 
collected from a MySpace profile of Ian Clark and presented in his murder trial had been 
admissible. This evidence not only played a part in the conviction of Clark for murder, but 
the court also upheld the opinion on appeal that the evidence gathered was admitted 
properly (Clark v. State of Indiana, 2009). The evidence in question had been a posting on 
his MySpace profile which the prosecution had admitted as character evidence.  
 
Read (2006) describes how a postgame riot at Penn State was documented 
photographically and posted to a Facebook profile specifically created for the viewing of 
these pictures. This open posting of pictures of rioters resulted in two arrests, and fifty 
administrative referrals. Read (ibid) also describes how MySpace was used in a missing 
persons case regarding a VCU student. Finally, Read (ibid) explained how several campus 
police departments used social networking sites to perform reconnaissance on where 
parties may occur.  
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Finally, in October 2009, Topping  reported that fugitive Maxi Sopo was located in Mexico 
and apprehended based solely on information in his Facebook profile. This case is a prime 
example of the powerful nature of social networking and novel connections among people. 
The fugitive Sopo’s profile was set to private. However as is often typical, his list of friends 
was not. The investigator noted that Sopo had a friend in his network who in turn had a 
connection to the US Justice Department. Although this connection was not represented 
online it proved to be useful. Through this connection, investigators were able to locate 
and apprehend Sopo in Mexico without actually having to make any direct connection with 
him or his profile. 
WHAT NEXT 
While the argument that there is useful information on these sites should be clear, what 
may not be are the next steps in forming methods or tools for investigators to use to access 
this information. The first steps would be to map what sites exist, the membership ranks, 
and study which combination of factors such as profile completeness, privacy settings, 
posting frequency, etc. are likely to provide results. A list of available profile fields was 
started by  creating accounts on Facebook, MySpace and Twitter and observing what was 
available at the time of this writing. This is provided in Appendix A, however a list alone has 
limited practical value.  
 
Additionally a prototype compilation of a quick checklist for investigators to refer to when 
performing investigations is provided. This sort of quick reference to techniques that may 
facilitate investigators' use of social networking sites to gather intelligence. It seems fitting 
to provide results of further study in such a checklist in order to provide investigators with 
sound recommendations. 
 
Further research into the success rates of locating non participating individuals through 
participating individuals' postings may also prove beneficial. If this technique proves to be 
feasible, it could mean that searching for intelligence on a non participating individual 
should become commonplace, and social network searching should be performed in all 
instances and not just when an investigative target has a profile. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Proposed are a few additional research topics that may facilitate the use of these sites by 
investigators. First, an easily accessed, published compilation of contact information, 
procedures, and policies regarding legal requests for each popular social networking would 
benefit investigators who may ultimately need to access information via these methods.  
 
Next, an investigation into the usefulness of built-in tools such as querying interfaces or 
languages, advertising mechanisms, or other site-specific tools should be performed. This 
research could produce procedures, software, interfaces, or resources for investigators to 
more easily search or access profile information through novel means. Determining what 
sorts of social methods, such as crowdsourcing, that can leverage the user community itself 
as a resource to assist in finding individuals or information may possibly benefit 
investigations.  
  Journal of Network Forensics 
 
 
 
Page 33 
 
 
Finally, each of these areas of practical knowledge seem to be well suited for presentation 
on an online resource to the investigative community, and this online resource is ultimately 
one goal for providing investigators what they need to effectively use these sites.  
CONCLUSION 
In summary, social networks have become well-established online collection points for 
several types of personally identifiable information as well as mapping interpersonal 
relationships. As these relationships are typically indicative of real-life relationships, the 
browsing and searching of these sites in order to gather intelligence in investigations 
becomes apparent. Since the kinds of information posted by users of these sites is known 
and willfully provided by the users, new tools and methods of lawfully accessing this 
information should be researched.  
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE FIELDS FOR FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, AND TWITTER 
Facebook MySpace Twitter 
Name/alias Name/alias Name/alias 
Photograph Photograph Photograph 
Networks  Lists 
Sex Sex  
Birthday Birthday  
Sexual orientation Sexual orientation  
Hometown Hometown Location 
Relationship status Relationship status  
Friends list Friends List Followers/Following/Lists 
Political views   
Religious views Religious views  
activities   
Interests   
Musical taste Musical taste  
Television taste Television taste  
Movie taste Movie taste  
Books taste Books taste  
Quotations   
Email address(es)  Email address 
Telephone number(s)   
Instant messenger ID(s)   
Educational history Educational history  
Employment history Employment history  
Group affiliations Networking Categories  
Photo albums Photo albums  
 Blog entries Link to online Bio 
 Personal 'about me' entry  
 Personal heroes  
 'Who I'd like to meet'  
 Zodiac sign  
 Parental status  
Online status Online status  
Chat 'wall', including time of post Chat 'comments', including date and 
time of post 
Chat 'tweets', including date and 
time of post 
 Income  
 Country  
 Postal Code  
 State  
Videos Videos  
 Intentions (dating, relationships, 
friendship, networking) 
 
 Height  
 Body Type  
 Drinker  
 Smoker  
 Ethnicity  
  Time Zone 
Posting method (mobile phone) Posting method (mobile) Posting method(software name) 
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2011 secau Security Congress  
Call for Papers 
 
“Building a Resilient Future” 
 
The 2011 secau Security Congress incorporates a continuum of new ideas and research ranging from digital 
to physical security and from highly technological solutions to human factors using scientific and socially 
embedded frameworks. The Congress aims to draw together competing and complementing areas of 
security as part of a holistic engagement with the wider security discourse. 
 
This is the first call to submit full academic papers for the 2011 secau Security Congress. Submitted papers 
must be in English, should be typed in a single column, single-spaced format, and must adhere to the 
maximum word limit of 3500 words. All submitted papers will be double blind peer reviewed and high 
quality papers will be considered for publication in selected journals.  The secau Congress will 
incorporate the following conferences from Monday 5 December to Wednesday 7 December, 2011 
 
12th Australian Information Warfare Conference 
9th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 
9th Australian Information Security Management Conference 
4th Australian Security & Intelligence Conference 
2nd Australian Counter Terrorism Conference 
 
Full papers for review should be submitted by the 30 September, 2011 
 
 
2nd International Cyber Resilience conference 
Call for Papers 
 
Monday 25 July and Tuesday 26 July, 2011 
 
The aim of the International Cyber Resilience Conference is to bring together practitioners, academics and 
Government agencies to discuss and explore issues relating to cyber resilience of information systems and 
critical infrastructures. The conference is meant to not only consider technical cyber security issues, but also 
the human factors that impact the risks associated with the secure management of critical infrastructures. In 
addition, how all factors in combination can impact the timely response and recovery of systems and critical 
infrastructures.  
 
The conference is across four main themes: 
 Incident Response and Recovery 
 Human Factors 
 Cyber Security 
 Risk Management 
 
Full papers for review should be submitted by the 29 April, 2011 
 
 
For further information contact the Conference Coordinator Lisa McCormack on +618 6304 5176 or email 
secau@ecu.edu.au .  For detailed information regarding paper submission please refer to the main 
conference website found at http://conferences.secau.org/  
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rigorous nature, are welcomed. These are items which are considered to indicate significant trends of special 
interest to subscribers. While these papers are still refereed, a more relaxed standard is applied, with the 
emphasis on interests and potential significance rather than academic rigor. 
 
Standard Journal submissions should be 3000 – 6000 words in length, although there can be flexibility in 
some circumstances.  Papers should not have been previously published.  Amended and augmented 
conference papers will be considered as long as copyright is cleared.  Copyright remains with the author(s) 
although the Journal of Network Forensics reserves the right to re-publish the paper for instance, in a 
collection of papers. 
 
Receipt of papers will be acknowledged. The reviewed papers will normally be returned within eight weeks. 
Accepted papers should be amended and returned to the editor within four weeks. Please do not use auto-
formatting or any other style. Please adhere to the style as specified by the editorial panel. A copy of the 
specific formatting requirements can be requested from the secau - Security Research Centre by emailing 
Lisa McCormack at  secau@ecu.edu.au 
 
Length of Papers 
Papers (title, abstract, main text) must normally not be more than 6000 words in length. Papers may be 
rejected if they are longer than the word limit. 
 
Author’s Responsibilities & Copyright 
Authors are to ensure the accuracy of their own papers. This journal does not accept any responsibility for 
statements made by authors in their written papers. Where relevant, authors are to ensure that the 
contents of their papers are cleared for publication, for example, by their employer, their client, the funding 
organisation and/or copyright owner of any material which is reproduced. Authors retain their copyright of 
the paper. 
 
Publication 
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publication in the published proceedings. 
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